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THE RIGHT TO SUBMIT "TESTIMONY" VIA 911
EMERGENCY AFTER CRAWFORD V.
WASHINGTON
Sweta Patel*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The right to confront one's accuser goes back hundreds of
years to the common law criminal justice system.' The
Confrontation Clause contained in the Sixth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution2 provides the accused with the right to
cross-examine those who testify against him or her.3 Twentyfive years ago, the Supreme Court established a test for the
admissibility of hearsay evidence in Ohio v. Roberts4 based on
the reliability of the statement.5 Recently, Crawford v.
Washington6 established a new test for the admissibility of
hearsay evidence7 under the Confrontation Clause. Crawford
restored the objective test of the Confrontation Clause by
extending the Clause's protection to "testimonial"
statements.8
However, the Court declined to offer a
* Technical Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 46; J.D. Candidate, Santa
Clara University School of Law; B.A., Economics, University of California
Berkeley.
1. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 1171, 1171 (2002).

2. The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In other words, the
prosecution's witnesses must give their testimony in the presence of the
accused, subject to cross-examination. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note
1, at 1171.
3. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).

4. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
5. Id. at 66.
6. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
7. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence at trial to prove
the truth of its assertion. BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 739 (8th ed. 2004).
8. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.
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comprehensive definition of "testimonial" statements .9
Recently, the lower courts have been left to sort out
Crawford's applicability to an assortment of hearsay
statements lacking a uniform test. 10
One of the most contentious issues is whether recordings
of 911 calls are admissible under the new Crawford
standard." Part II of this comment discusses the history of
the Confrontation Clause, the Roberts decision, and the
recent Crawford decision." Part II also discusses seven cases
that have considered the admissibility of 911 calls following
Crawford.3 These cases illustrate how courts inconsistently
define "testimonial" when considering statements made
during 911 calls, and the disagreement as to their
admissibility when a witness is unavailable. 4
Part III
identifies the problem with applying the Crawford definition
of "testimonial" to 911 calls. 5 Part IV analyzes the different
definitions of "testimonial" that have been used in recent
cases concerning the admissibility of 911 calls.' 6 Finally, Part
V proposes how courts should analyze statements made
during 911 calls when determining whether they are
"testimonial" under Crawford.7
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Ambiguity of the Confrontation Clause

The right to confront one's accuser was not a novel
concept to the Framers of the Constitution." In fact, the
right to confront one's accuser has a long history dating back
to Roman times." Two inferences about the meaning of the

9. Id. at 68.
10. See, e.g., Will Hood III & Lucia Padilla, The Right to Confront Witnesses
After Crawford v. Washington, 33 COLO. LAW. 83, 84 (Criminal Law Newsletter)
(Sept. 2004).
11. See discussion infra Part III.
12. See discussion infra Part II.A-C.
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.
14. See id.
15. See discussion infra Part III.
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
17. See discussion infra Part V.
18. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004).
19. Id.
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Confrontation Clause can be made by examining its history.20
First, the Confrontation Clause is applied when ex parte
examinations are used as evidence against the accused. 2 '
During the seventeenth century, Sir Walter Raleigh was
executed based on the hearsay of his accuser and alleged
accomplice.2 2 Raleigh demanded that his accuser appear in
court, believing that he would recant his false statement
when confronted.2 3 Raleigh said, "'[tihe Proof of the Common
Law is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him
The judge
. ,
speak it. Call my accuser before my face
refused Raleigh's request and he was sentenced to death.2 5
Thereafter, English law developed a right of confrontation
through statutory and judicial reforms to end such
outcomes 26
The right of confrontation, which became part of the U.S.
Constitution as the Sixth Amendment in 1791,27 was intended
to strengthen the adversarial process.28 The Confrontation
Clause states, "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . .to be confronted with the witnesses
In State v. Webb,3 ° the North Carolina
against him ....
Supreme Court held that the right of confrontation "is a rule
of common law, founded on natural justices, that no man
shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty
to cross examine."3 1 Moreover, the Confrontation Clause
guarantees an open procedure, a chance for the defendant to
examine the weakness of the witness's testimony, and
discourages false testimony by providing the defendant a

20. Id. at 50.
21. Id.
22. Hood & Padilla, supra note 10, at 83. The hearsay statements at issue
were made by the accuser to officers when they examined him and were
answers to interrogation. Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalizationof
the Confrontation Clause: A Proposal for a ProsecutorialRestraint Model, 76
MINN. L. REV. 557, 570-71 (1992).

23.
24.
25.
26.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id.

27. Id. at 49; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW xlvi (Sydney M.

Irmas, ed., 2001).
28. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49-50.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

30. State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (1794).
31. Webb, 2 N.C. at 104.
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to "dispute and explore the weaknesses

in the

witness's testimony. "32
The U.S Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the
proposition that the Confrontation Clause applies only to incourt testimony; instead, it has held that the application of
the Clause to out-of-court testimony depends on the rules of
evidence. 3' However, "[1]eaving the regulation of out-of-court
statements to the law of evidence would render the
Confrontation Clause powerless to prevent even the most
flagrant inquisitorial practices."3 4 Some ex parte statements
are admissible under the hearsay evidentiary exceptions, yet
the Framers would not have approved of such an admission
without questioning whether the statement passes the
muster of the Confrontation Clause. 5 The Clause does not
limit "witnesses" to those who testify in court, but rather, it
takes a broad view. 36 The Court found "witnesses" to be those
who "bear testimony."37 In addition, the Court deemed the
definition of "testimony" to be a "'solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving
some fact.' 3' Therefore, according to the Court, testimony is
not limited to in-court statements, and it also includes certain
out-of-court statements, such as ex parte statements.3 9
The second inference about the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause is that the Framers did not intend for
the admission of "testimonial" statements in court unless the
declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine him.4 ° The prior opportunity to
cross-examine a witness is a necessary condition and not
merely a method to establish reliability. 41 However, if the
32. Brief for Law Professors Sherman J. Clark & James J. Duane et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting of Petitioner at 14, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754958.
33. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51.
34. Id. at 51.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id.

38. Id. (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).

DICTIONARY

OF THE

39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
40. Id. at 53-54.
41. The cross-examination of a witness is a necessary condition because that
right cannot be substituted by proving reliability through other means. See id.
at 55-56. Despite there being exceptions to the general rule excluding hearsay
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statement is not "testimonial" in nature, the Confrontation
Clause is inapplicable and the rules of evidence determine the
statement's admissibility.4 2
B. The End of Ohio v. Roberts
For twenty-five years, courts adhered to the test for
admissibility established by the Supreme Court in Ohio v.
Roberts.4 3
In Roberts, the Court decided that hearsay
statements would not violate the Confrontation Clause and
thus would be admissible when the declarant was unavailable
and the statement fell within a hearsay exception or was
trustworthy.'
Because the witness in Roberts was unavailable for crossexamination, the Court explored whether the defendant could
test the trustworthiness of the testimony such that the goal of
a "face-to-face accusation" was achieved.4 5
The Court,
reviewing its precedent, noted that the goal of the
Confrontation Clause was to establish sufficient "indicia of
reliability" and allow "'the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of the prior statement."'4 The Court
further reasoned that the Confrontation Clause and hearsay
rules were "'designed to protect similar values'"47 and they
"'stem from the same roots.' 48
Hence, the rule that emerged from Roberts allowed
constitutionally admissible hearsay statements to be
admitted if the declarant was unavailable and the statements
fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" 49 or contained
evidence, the exceptions should not apply to "testimonial" statements. Id.
42. Id. at 60-61.
43. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
44. Id. at 65-66. The trial court in Roberts admitted hearsay testimony from
defendant's preliminary hearing that contradicted his testimony that he had
permission to use the credit cards and checks at issue. Id. at 59-60. The
appellate court reversed defendant's conviction based on a violation of his
constitutional right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, and the Ohio
Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 60. The Supreme Court reviewed the case on
certiorari. Id. at 59-62.
45. Id. at 65.
46. Id. at 65-66 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)).
47. Id. at 66 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)).
48. Id. (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970).
49. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
"Firmly rooted hearsay exceptions" are
exceptions to the general rule of exclusion, such as business records and
statements in furtherance of a conspiracy. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E), 803(6).
Several of the hearsay exceptions had been established by 1791. Crawford v.
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"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. ' 50 The Roberts
test allowed juries to hear statements made by a witness who
could not be cross-examined based on a judicial determination
of reliability.5 1 Although this test drew heavy criticism, it
was not until the Supreme Court decided Crawford in March
2004 that Roberts was abrogated. 2
C. Crawford v. Washington
In Crawford v. Washington,3 the Court reexamined the
Confrontation Clause and held that "testimonial" statements
made by an unavailable witness in a criminal trial are
inadmissible unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine the witness. 4 However, Crawford failed to
define what constitutes a "testimonial" statement.5
In Crawford, the defendant was charged with the assault
and attempted murder of a man who allegedly tried to rape
the defendant's wife, Sylvia. 6 Sylvia's statement to the police
contradicted her husband's statement.5 ' Although Sylvia did
not testify at trial due to marital privilege,55 the prosecution
played a recording of her statement to the police for the
jury.5 9 The trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce
her prior statement, reasoning that it bore particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness because Sylvia corroborated
her husband's statement that he acted in self-defense, that
she had direct knowledge of the incident, that the incident
was recent, and that she was "questioned by a 'neutral' law
enforcement officer."60 However, the Washington Court of
Appeals reversed on the grounds that the statement did not

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).
50. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
51. See id.
52. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-68.
53. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
54. Id. at 68.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 38.
57. Id. at 41.
58. Id. at 40. "Marital privilege" is defined as "[tihe privilege allowing a
spouse not to testify in a criminal case as an adverse witness against the other
spouse, regardless of the subject matter of the testimony." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1236 (8th ed. 2004).
59. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40.
60. Id.
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sufficiently guarantee trustworthiness. 6 ' The appellate court
offered several reasons for the reversal, including the fact
that Sylvia admitted having her eyes closed while her
husband allegedly stabbed the victim. 6 2 The Washington
Supreme Court reinstated the conviction, concluding that
while Sylvia's statement did not fall within an established
hearsay exception, it bore guarantees of trustworthiness
because Sylvia and the defendant's statements overlapped.6 3
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the trial court's admission of Sylvia's statement
violated the Confrontation Clause6 4 and unanimously
reversed, remanding the case for a new trial.6
The Court
held that hearsay evidence deemed "testimonial" cannot be
allowed in court under the Confrontation Clause unless the
witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.6 6
Sylvia was
unavailable in court and the prosecution sought to admit her
statement from her police interrogation.6 ' Despite the Court's
failure to provide a definition of testimonial, it held that
Sylvia's statement was "testimonial" under any definition.68
The Court reasoned that Sylvia's testimony should not have
been admitted because it was "knowingly given in response to
structured police questioning,"69 it was elicited through
leading questions, ° and only cross-examination could reveal
whether her testimony was reliable. 7

61. Id. at 41.
62. Id. Some of the other factors considered by the appellate court were
that the witness's statement contradicted her husband's, her statement to the
police was made in response to specific questions, and her statement differed
from defendant's statement on the issue of self-defense. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 42. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3 for a discussion of the
Confrontation Clause.
65. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69.
66. Id. at 68.
67. See id. at 40.
68. See id. at 61.
69. Id. at 53 n.4.
70. Id. at 65 ("In response to often leading questions from police detectives,
she implicated her husband in Lee's stabbing and at least arguably undermined
his self-defense claim.").
71. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69.
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1. Roberts Abrogated
The Court in Crawford ultimately created new precedent
because of its departure from Roberts on the issue of
reliability.7 2 The holding in Roberts was based on the finding
that the Sixth Amendment only required "substantial
compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation
requirement."7 3 Thus, the Court held that hearsay evidence
is permissible in court if reliability of the statement is
established.74
The Court emphasized that reliability has not historically
been an exception to the Confrontation Clause.75
A
statement's reliability depends on the factors considered by a
judge and how much weight he or she gives to them, neither
of which are prescribed by the Sixth Amendment. 6 The
Court further reasoned that vague standards are manipulable
and the Framers would not have wanted such standards to be
used where the objectivity of a judiciary is blurred.7 7
Although the Confrontation Clause's ultimate goal is to
guarantee reliability, it provides a procedural guarantee, not
a substantive one. 78 The Court clarified that as a procedural
guarantee, it does not ensure that evidence is reliable, but
requires that its reliability be assessed through crossexamination.79 Crawford explained that "[d]ispensing with
confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin
to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously
guilty."80
Therefore, Crawford held that a statement is
reliable under the Sixth Amendment only when the
defendant is allowed to confront and cross-examine a witness

72. Id. at 69-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
73. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 69 (1980) (quoting California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 166 (1970)).
74. Id. at 66.
75. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
76. Id. at 62-63.
77. Id. at 67-68.

78. Id. at 61.

A substantive right is "[a] right that can be protected or

enforced by law; a right of substance rather than form . . . [It is a] right that so
completely and definitely belongs to a person that it cannot be impaired or
taken away without the person's consent." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1349 (8th
ed. 2004).
A procedural right is "[a] right that derives from legal or
administrative procedure; a right that helps in the protection or enforcement of
a substantive right." Id. at 1348.
79. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
80. Id. at 62.
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who has made a "testimonial" statement.8 '
2. What is "Testimonial" Under Crawford?
While the Supreme Court in Crawford did not clearly
define when statements are "testimonial," it did provide some
guidance.82 At the very least, the term includes prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, at a
former trial, or during police interrogations.83 The Court used
the term "interrogation" in a colloquial, rather than technical
sense.' The Court found that Sylvia's statement fell within
the meaning of "interrogation" because it was "in response to
structured police questioning." 8 However, the definition was
not limited to the facts of Crawford. 6
The Court also recognized definitions of "testimonial"
from other sources without accepting or rejecting the
formulations offered." The Court observed that formalized
testimonial materials such as affidavits, depositions, or prior
confessions are "testimonial" in nature.8 8
The broadest
definition of "testimonial" was offered by the National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), 9 which
states that when an objective witness believes that a
statement will be available for use in future prosecution, the
statement is "testimonial."90 Without further clarity from the
Supreme Court as to what constitutes a "testimonial"
statement, lower courts have been left to create their own
definitions.
3. Are 911 Emergency Calls "Testimonial"?
Prior to Crawford, a 911 emergency call for help was
81. See id. at 68-69.
82. See id. at 68 & n.10.
83. Id. at 68 n.10.
84. Id. at 53 n.4.
85. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4.
86. See id. at 53.
87. See id. at 51-52.
88. Id. (citing White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992)).
89. The NACDL is an organization committed to ensuring justice and due
process for persons accused of crime or other misconduct. Nat'l Ass'n of
Criminal
Def.
Lawyers,
Who
We
Are,
http'//www.nacdl.org/public.nsfffreeform/WhoWeAre?OpenDocument
(last
visited Mar. 2, 2006). The organization is composed of private criminal defense
lawyers, public defenders, law professors, and judges, to list a few. Id.
90. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
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admitted into evidence under the "excited utterance" 91
hearsay exception 92 without violating the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause.93 Crawford casts serious doubt upon
such a classification because the test is not whether a 911 call
falls under a hearsay exception, but whether a 911 call is
"testimonial" in nature.9 4 If deemed "testimonial," the Sixth
Amendment bars the use of the statement at trial unless the
witness is unavailable and the defendant has had an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness.9 5
D. Post-CrawfordInterpretationsof "Testimonial"
Courts have applied Crawford's holding to consider
whether 911 calls are "testimonial."9 6 However, the lack of a
precise definition of "testimonial" has resulted in a patchwork
of analyses and holdings on the issue.97 This section will
discuss how courts have applied Crawford to the factual
circumstances surrounding 911 calls and have thereby
reached differing definitions of "testimonial."
1.

Non-Testimonial Calls
a.

Calls Made by Victims

Several cases have found 911 calls not to be "testimonial"
in instances where the victim made the call. As a case of first
impression, People v. Moscat98 answered the question of
whether a 911 call is testimonial in nature under Crawford.99
A 911 call made by a domestic assault victim, who was later
unavailable at trial, was key to the prosecution's case.'00 The
defendant moved to exclude the 911 call, claiming that it

91. People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (Crim. Ct. 2004) ("[To qualify a
statement as an excited utterance the party offering the statement must show
that the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by an external

event sufficient to still the declarant's reflective faculties, thereby preventing
opportunity for deliberation which might lead the declarant to be untruthful.").
92. See supra note 49 for a discussion of hearsay exceptions.
93. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 879 (citing White, 502 U.S. at 346).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See discussion infra Parts II.D.1-2.

97. Id.
98. People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Crim. Ct. 2004).
99. See id. at 876.

100. Id. at 875.
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violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation." 1
The court held that the 911 call was not "testimonial" for
several reasons. 10 2 First, the court noted that the 911 call
was made by a complainant seeking protection from the
police, not by a desire to produce evidence or to prosecute the
alleged assailant. 10 3 Second, the court stated that a 911 call is
inherently different from a testimonial statement in a pretrial examination conducted by a government officer hoping
to prosecute. 0 4 The 911 caller "summons the government to
her aid," while the "government summons a citizen to be a
witness" in a pre-trial examination. 05 Third, a 911 call is
part of a criminal incident, usually made while the incident is
in progress or immediately thereafter. 0 6 Fourth, a person
giving a formal statement or deposition is conscious about the
effect his testimony will have on legal proceedings. 10 7 In
contrast, a person fearing bodily injury or having recently
suffered bodily injury does not contemplate being a witness in
For
future legal proceedings when calling 911 for help.'
these reasons, the 911 call in Moscat was held not to be
"testimonial." 09
In Minnesota v. Wright,"0 the Minnesota Court of
Appeals also ruled that a 911 call made by a victim was not
"testimonial.""' In Wright, a 911 call was made by a woman
The
alleging that the defendant had threatened her." 2
tape
into
the
911
to
introduce
prosecutor was permitted
evidence for the jury to hear despite the caller's unavailability
3
in court."
Although Crawford was decided after the defendant's
trial, the appellate court reviewed the admissibility of the 911
call under the test set forth in Crawford."' To determine
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 879.
Id.
Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
Id.
Id. at 880.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Minnesota v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 302.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 300. Decisions of the Supreme Court are "given retroactive effect
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whether the 911 call was "testimonial," Wright held that
statements made "moments after the criminal offense and
under the stress of that event, are not 'testimonial' under
Crawford ....",,11 The court reasoned that there is enough
privacy surrounding 911 calls that citizens should be
encouraged
to
call
911
without
considering
the
repercussions. 116 Furthermore, the court found that a call
made by a person struggling to survive does not equate to a
response to structured questioning in an investigative
environment in which a person would expect their statements
to be used in judicial proceedings. 1 '7
An identical result was reached in California in People v.
Corella."' In Corella, the defendant's wife placed a 911 call
alleging that the defendant hit her. 119 The prosecution played
the tape for the jury during trial, although the wife was
unavailable in court.1 20 On appeal, the defendant contended
that the admission of the 911 call violated his constitutional
121
right to confrontation.
The court focused on differentiating the circumstance of a
911 call from that found in a police interrogation. 1 22 Corella
noted that "a police interrogation requires a relatively formal
investigation where a trial is contemplated." 123
The
statements held to be "testimonial police interrogation" in
Crawford were made in response to structured police
questioning. 1 24 In contrast, Corella held that 911 calls have
no such formal quality.' 25 To the contrary, 911 operators ask
callers questions to determine an appropriate response to the

in criminal cases when it is Constitutional in nature and affects the
determination of guilt or innocence." New York v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274,
276 (App. Div. 2004). If it was "testimonial," then the lower court's evidentiary
ruling would have been a constitutional error and the defendant would be
entitled to a new trial unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Wright, 686 N.W.2d at 300.
115. Id. at 302.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. People v. Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th 461 (Ct. App. 2004).
119. Id. at 464.
120. Id. at 465.
121. Id. at 464.
122. Id. at 468.
123. Id.
124. Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th at 468.
125. Id.
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incident. 126 Thus, the Corella court held that the 911 call
made by the spouse was not "testimonial."127
Like the cases discussed above, the California Court of
Appeals in People v. Aubrey 2 " discussed the "testimonial"
nature of 911 calls and found them to be admissible. 29 In
Aubrey, the jury heard a 911 call made by a victim despite the
caller's unavailability in court. 3 ° Relying on Crawford, the
Amendment right to
defendant asserted that his Sixth
3
confront the victim was violated.'

1

The court interpreted Crawford to suggest that a
a
statement is not "testimonial" unless it is made during 132
expected.
is
trial
future
a
and
proceeding
formal
relatively
The defendant contended that the statements made during a
911 call are essentially equivalent responses that would be33
made to an officer questioning a person at his or her home.
The court disagreed with the defendant's characterization of
911 calls, finding that 911 calls can be better characterized as
"the electronically augmented equivalent of a loud cry for
help." 34 Therefore, the court held that the call was not
"testimonial," and thus, admission of35 the 911 recording did
not violate the Confrontation Clause.
b. Calls Made by Witnesses
Soon after Moscat, the court in People v. Conyers 36 ruled
that 911 calls made by witnesses are admissible. 37 Unlike
Moscat, the caller in Conyers was not the victim, but rather a
witness to the incident.'38 The defendant's mother made two
911 calls while she witnessed a street-fight between the
defendant and her son-in-law.' 39 The first call sought
126.
127.
128.
2004).
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id. at 467.
People v. Aubrey, No. E035037, 2004 WL 2378400 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 25,
Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Aubrey, 2004 WL 2378400, at *7.
Id.
People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274 (App. Div. 2004).
Id. at 277.
See id. at 275; supra text accompanying note 100.
Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
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assistance in stopping the ongoing fight and the second call
requested an ambulance. 140 The prosecution attempted to
introduce the two calls under a hearsay exception, but the
defendant claimed that the admissibility of such evidence
would violate his Sixth Amendment right to confront the
141
caller, who was unavailable in court.
The court justified its ruling by reasoning that the
witness's statements were mere reactions to a violent
incident. 142 Furthermore, the calls were made in order to stop
the violence, and the declarant probably did not consider that
43
she would be summoned as a witness in future proceedings.
For these reasons, the court held that the 911 calls were not
"testimonial" in nature under Crawford, and the defendant's
constitutional rights were not violated by their admission.'4
2.

Testimonial Calls

a. Calls Made by Witnesses
Some courts have held 911 calls to be testimonial. People
v. Cortes11 is such an example. In Cortes, a witness called
146
911 during the commission of a crime to report the incident.
The prosecution sought to introduce recordings of the call
147
even though the witness was unavailable to testify.
The court began its inquiry by focusing on whether the
911 call was a product of interrogation by referring to the
definition of "interrogation." 48
The dictionary defined
"interrogation" as "the act of questioning" and "examination
by questions. '' 14' Furthermore, the court noted that, recently,
dictionaries have added the words "systematic" or "formal" to
the definition. 150 The court reasoned that a call reporting a

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 275.
Id.
Id. at 276-77.
Id. at 277.

144. Id.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (App. Div. 2004).
Id. at 403-04.
Id. at 402-03.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 404-05 (citing NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).

150. Id. (citing OXFORD
(2002)).

AMERICAN DESK DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS
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crime falls within these definitions of "interrogation" because
15 1
the operator first inquires into the details of the emergency.
Furthermore, the court observed that 911 operators are
trained to extract certain information from the caller. 152 The
court found that repeated announcements, television, movies,
and the Internet have made the public aware of what
information must be supplied when reporting a crime.51 3 The
court cited numerous websites to illustrate that various
organizations, including the New York City Police
4
Department, prepare the public to report crimes via 911.11
Therefore, callers are likely to know that the police
department collects information about crimes from 911
calls.1 55
Moreover, 911 calls are also formal by definition because
operators follow established procedures and rules to collect
information systematically. 56 Cortes stated that formality
cannot be limited to courtroom procedure for questioning a
witness. 157 The court held that the facts of the case fell within
Crawford's definition of interrogation, thus making the
statement "testimonial" in nature and inadmissible without
158
cross-examination of the witness who made the 911 call.
b. Calls Made by Victims
Like 911 calls made by witnesses, 911 calls made by
victims have also been held to be "testimonial."
In
Washington v. Powers, 9 a case deciding that 911 calls are
"testimonial," the 911 caller reported that the defendant had
entered her home in violation of a restraining order. 16 0
Following the test from Ohio v. Roberts, the court admitted
into evidence the 911 tape without subjecting the caller to
161
cross-examination.
Shortly after the trial court proceedings in Powers, the
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
See id. at 406.
Id.
Id. at 405-06.
Id.
Id. at 406.
Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 407.
Id.
Washington v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 1263.
Id.
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Supreme Court decided Crawford.6 2 In light of the Court's
holding, the defendant in Powers appealed on the grounds
that the trial court's admission of the 911 call violated his
right to confront his accuser. 163 Realizing that the facts in
Powers fell somewhere in between the facts of Moscat and
Cortes, the Powers court used the holdings in those two cases
as a guide. 164 As in Cortes, the caller in Powers called to
report a crime. 165 However, unlike Moscat, it was not a call
66
for help. 1
The Powers court also turned to a law review article
written prior to Crawford discussing the nature of 911
calls.'6 7 The article concludes that a reasonable person knows
that the information from his or her call will be forwarded to
68
the police and possibly used in future prosecution.1
Therefore, the caller's statement may be characterized either
as a request for immediate assistance or to provide
information.'6 9 The article states that where 911 calls contain
detailed and lengthy statements aimed at providing
information, they are "testimonial" in nature. 7 ° Seeing that a
bright line standard would not serve the purpose of the rule
in Crawford, the court held that trial courts could best assess
the admissibility of each 911 call on a case-by-case basis.' 7 '
The facts in Powers indicated that the 911 call was
neither part of the criminal incident nor a request for help,
but was instead intended to report the violation of an existing
protective order.172
Therefore, the court found that the
witness knew that her statements would result in the
defendant's arrest. 73 The court held that her statements
1 74
were "testimonial" and inadmissible against the defendant.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
Id. at 1262-63.
Id. at 1264-65.
Powers, 99 P.3d at 1265.
Id. at 1264-65.
See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 1, at 1242.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Powers, 99 P.3d at 1266.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE LEGAL PROBLEM

The Court in Crawford recognized that its refusal to
define "testimonial" comprehensively would cause interim
uncertainty, 1 5 yet it reasoned that the new test was superior
176
to the one in Roberts, which was inherently unpredictable.
Uncertainty among lower courts followed the Crawford
ruling, just as the Court anticipated.'7 7 The Court may have
been correct to believe that the Crawford test had greater
long-term potential to provide a predictable framework, but
until that predictability is realized, lower courts are left with
In his concurrence, Chief Justice
difficult choices. 78
Rehnquist recognized that prosecutors need to know which
statements fall under the new rule now, not years from
now.179 Despite its unpredictability, the Roberts framework
lasted almost twenty-five years.1 80 The courts cannot wait
another twenty-five years for the Supreme Court to clarify
the definition of "testimonial."'8 '
The disagreement among courts over the testimonial
nature of 911 calls is evident. 8 2This comment discusses seven
cases, five of which held that 911 calls are not testimonial
and two of which held that they were testimonial. 8 3 The
following section critically analyzes the reasoning used by
courts to determine which definition best serves the purpose
of Crawford with regard to 911 calls."
IV. ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the distinct elements of a 911 call,
as discussed in the cases that followed Crawford. These
elements serve an important purpose in determining whether
or not a 911 call is "testimonial." Factors that courts have
considered are the status of the caller as a victim or a
witness, the objective state of mind of the declarant, and the

175. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 n.10 (2004).
176. Id.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See Hood & Padilla, supra note 10, at 84.
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 n.10.
Id. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Hood & Padilla, supra note 10, at 83.
See Crawford,541 U.S. at 75 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
See discussion supra Part II.D.
See id.
See discussion infra Part IV.
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intent of the 911 operator.8 5
Additionally, although
Crawford did not provide a complete definition of
"testimonial," it did recognize that "police interrogations" fall
within the definition. 186
This recognition has been a
significant factor in determining the admissibility of 911 calls
when a witness is unavailable.8 7
A. Status of 911 Caller as Victim or Witness
For the purpose of this analysis, callers fall into two
categories: those who are victims and those who are
witnesses. Courts have widely used the caller's classification
in determining if a call is "testimonial" in nature.'
Most of the cases in which 911 calls were found to be
"non-testimonial" were those in which the 911 calls were
made by victims of a crime. 8 9 A 911 call can be considered
part of the criminal incident itself because the events occur
quickly and the victim is merely reacting to the incident by
calling for help. 9 ° Therefore, when a victim calls 911, courts
have reasoned that since the caller is calling for immediate
assistance, future prosecution is not contemplated.' 9 '
However, at least one court has held a 911 call to be nontestimonial when the caller is not a victim, but a witness to
the crime. 192 The court in Conyers applied logic that was
similar to cases in which the caller was a victim. 93 A person
witnessing a criminal incident may be reacting to the event
185. See discussion supra Part II.D.
186. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
187. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.a.
188. See discussion supra Part II.D.
189. See discussion supra Part II.D.l.a.
190. See People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880 (Crim. Ct. 2004) (noting
that "Imlany 911 calls are made while an assault or homicide is still in
progress" or during the immediate aftermath of a crime).
191. See People v. Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th 461, 468 (Ct. App. 2004) (noting
that a victim making a 911 call is seeking assistance and there is no police
interrogation in contemplation of future prosecution); State v. Wright, 686
N.W.2d 295, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that 911 calls are usually made
because the caller wants protection and not because the caller expects the
report to be used at a later trial); Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 879 (stating that the
genesis of a 911 call is an urgent desire to be rescued from immediate peril,
rather than the desire to prosecute or seek evidence).
192. People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274, 277 (App. Div. 2004).
193. Id. at 276-77 (noting that the caller was "react[ing] to the life
threatening crisis unfolding before her eyes" although she was not the victim of
the assault).
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before her, just as a victim would. In Conyers, the witness's
194
call was also a cry for help, only not for herself.
Courts should not rely on the status of a caller to
determine the admissibility of a 911 call. There is no
generally applied rule on how a caller's status should affect a
ruling, nor is there any rule about how the caller's status
might affect the nature of the statement. Therefore, although
courts have used the status of a caller as part of their
analysis,1 95 it should not be conclusive. Relying solely on the
status of a caller would allow a "label" to determine the
nature of the call and ignore all other circumstances
surrounding the call. Although allowing a "label" to be the
sole determining factor would achieve uniformity in the
courts, it would not guarantee reliability or satisfy the
96
Confrontation Clause.
B. The Caller's State of Mind
Some courts have gone beyond classifying a caller as a
victim or witness and considered the 911 caller's state of
mind. 97 For example, the courts in Wright, Conyers, and
Cortes addressed whether the caller's objective or subjective
state of mind was relevant to determining if the 911 call was
"testimonial." 98
Courts and authorities have suggested that the
reasonable person standard is the proper test for determining
if a statement is "testimonial." 9 9 The NACDL finds that
"testimonial"
statements
are
those
"'made
under
circumstances that would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available
for use at a later trial."'2 °° Although this definition was cited
194. Id.
195. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
197. See State v. Wright, 686 N.W.2d 295, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004)
(considering the reasonable victim's state of mind regarding the use of the 911
call); People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 407 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that "it
makes no difference what the caller believes" for determining the purpose of the
911 call, although all callers are likely to know how the information might be
used); Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 277 (considering the caller's subjecting
"intention in placing the 911 calls").
198. See supra note 197.
199. See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
200. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004) (quoting Brief for the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae at 3,
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in Crawford, the Court did not explicitly accept or reject it. 20 1
However, applying this definition, Wright held that a
statement made by a victim cannot be "testimonial."2 °2
Wright reasoned that a reasonable victim who calls 911 just
moments after the incident and while she is fighting to
survive would not know that the statements might be used in
a future proceeding. 203
The court then contrasted this
situation with that of a structured police interrogation, where
a reasonable person might expect his or her responses to be
used in judicial proceedings.2 4 Therefore, it can be inferred
that an objective victim would not reasonably believe that the
statements he or she made during a 911 call would be used in
future judicial proceedings. 0 5
On the other hand, when the caller is a witness to the
criminal incident, the analysis is more complicated. The
Conyers opinion did not apply an objective witness
standard.2 6 Instead, it focused on the subjective thoughts of
2 7 After hearing the witness's
the witness.
panicked 911 call,
the court concluded that "her intention in placing the 911
calls was to stop the assault in progress and not to consider
the legal ramifications of herself as a witness in a future
208
proceeding."
In contrast to Conyers, Cortes also involved a witness
caller, but the court unequivocally stated that a caller's belief
is irrelevant. 0 9 Cortes ruled that "[w]hen a 911 call is made
to report a crime and supply information about the
circumstances and the people involved, the purpose of the
information is for investigation, prosecution, and potential
use at a judicial proceeding." 210
However, earlier in the
opinion, the court reasoned that 911 callers are likely to know
that the information might be used for prosecutorial reasons
given that media, private organizations, and police

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410), 2003 WL 21754961).
201. See id.
202. Wright, 686 N.W.2d at 302.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See id.
206. See People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276-77 (App. Div. 2004).
207. Id.
208. Id. (citing People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880 (Crim. Ct. 2004)).
209. People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 415 (App. Div. 2004).
210. Id.
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departments dispense this information.2 11 While Conyers
subjectively judged the witness's intent, Cortes judged the
witness by the substance of the call rather than the caller's
2 12
intent.
Neither Conyers nor Cortes applied the test correctly.
Conyers took the court in a direction that Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas warned against in White v. Illinois.1 3 The
Justices concluded that focusing on the witness's intent would
bind the courts in a multitude of difficulties because few
statements can be "categorically characterized" as being made
in contemplation of legal proceedings.2 14 Nevertheless, the
court in Conyers took into account the witness's identity as
the defendant's mother and victim's mother in-law, as well as
the sound of her voice in determining her intentions in
placing the call.215
According to the Supreme Court, analyzing the witness's
subjective state of mind is not commensurate with the right of
confrontation.1 6 Judges make the ultimate decision as to the
intent of the witness and the admissibility of the statement.2 17
Yet, in overruling Roberts, the Court emphasized that the
Roberts test was unpredictable and highly subjective because
judges had the choice of countless factors when examining the
reliability of a statement.2 8 A similar problem lies where a
non-witness caller's subjective intent is considered because
there is neither concrete evidence nor criteria for determining
a caller's intent.
Another question for courts is whether they should take
into consideration the subjective or objective intent of a caller.
An inquiry into a person's subjective state of mind is risky,
especially when the person has not appeared in court for
211. See id. at 407.
212. See id. at 415; People v. Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d 274, 276-77 (App. Div.
2004).
213. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
214. Id. at 364 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Gerald F. Uelmen,
PreservingCrawford Objections, CHAMPION, July 28, 2004, at 46.
215. See Conyers, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 276-77.
216. Cf Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 65 (2004) ("It is not enough to
point out that most of the usual safeguards of the adversary process attend the
statement, when the single safeguard missing is the one the Confrontation
Clause demands.").
217. See id. at 67 (recognizing the judicial discretion in the courts below and
viewing the Constitution as prescribing a procedural safeguard).
218. See id. at 63.
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examination and the state of mind cannot be verified. The
Court noted the objective intent formulation offered by
NACDL without accepting or rejecting it. 219 The objective
person standard is certainly easier to apply, but is criticized
for allowing courts to determine what a reasonable person of
a certain age and under circumstances would believe. 22 ° The
Supreme Court has not made its position clear regarding
whether the subjective or objective intent of a witness should
be considered, and therefore lower courts remain free to make
their own judgments.2 21
C. Intent of the 911 Operator
Some scholars have argued that the intent of a 911
operator should be used to determine if a 911 call is
"testimonial."22 2 Crawford is aimed at preventing abuse by
government officials when information is elicited with the
goal of convicting a suspect.2 2 3 Thus, Crawford has been
interpreted to imply strongly that the "status and motivations
of the person eliciting the information, not the perceptions of
the declarant should determine" if a statement is
"testimonial" in all situations.22 4 Scholars have argued that
an objective assessment of the status and purpose of the
questioner would better serve the purpose of Crawford
because it eliminates the potential for abuse when
information is elicited by government officials.225
This type of inquiry into the questioner's intent is
inappropriate because, although the Framers wanted to
minimize the potential for abuse by government officials, the
Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to confront a witness
only when the witness has produced testimony against the
accused, not when a separate party deems the witness's

219. See id. at 52 (noting the formulation offered by the NACDL: "statements
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial."); see also Friedman & McCormack, supra note 1, at 1240; Uelmen, supra
note 214, at 46.
220. See Hood & Padilla, supra note 10, at 84-85.
221. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
222. See Hood & Padilla, supra note 10, at 85.
223. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. For instance, a prosecutor may elicit a
statement from an accomplice that incriminates the defendant. Id. at 56.
224. Hood & Padilla, supra note 10, at 85.
225. See id.
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statements to be "testimonial."2 26
More importantly, the
Confrontation Clause does not protect the defendant from
coercion by government officials.22 7 Rather, it guarantees the
right to challenge the credibility of the accuser.228
In addition, the problem this test attempts to resolve still
remains. The Framers were concerned about the impartiality
of the judiciary and knew that it may not always be trusted to
The potential for
safeguard the rights of the people. 229
governmental abuse remains present as judges make the
ultimate decision regarding the intent of the objective person
and the ultimate admissibility of the statement on an
evidentiary ruling.23 0 Therefore, the intent of a 911 operator
should not be used to determine if a 911 call is "testimonial."
D. Are 911 Calls Interrogations?
Although "police interrogation" is not the only accepted
definition of "testimonial," it is a safe starting point because
2 31
the Supreme Court explicitly identified it as such.
Crawford resolved some of the uncertainty surrounding the
definition of "testimonial" by asserting that a police
interrogation is "testimonial" under any definition, yet left it
up to lower courts to determine what constitutes an
interrogation.23 2 Corella, Moscat, and Cortes reached
different conclusions as to whether 911 calls fall within the
definition of interrogation.2 33 Moscat found that a 911 call
was not analogous to an interrogation.23 4 Similarly, Corella
found that a 911 call did not resemble an interrogation.2 35
Relying on Crawford's application Corella applied a narrow
definition, even though the Crawford Court noted that "one
can imagine various definitions of 'interrogation,' and we

226. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7 (noting that
hearsay evidence of testimonial statements are rarely admissible against the
accused in a criminal case).
227. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 79, 81 and accompanying text.
229. Crawford,541 U.S. at 67.
230. See id.
231. Id. at 68.
232. Id.
233. See discussion supra Parts III.D.l.a, III.D.2.a.
234. People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880 (Crim. Ct. 2004).
235. People v. Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th 461, 468 (Ct. App. 2004).
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need not select among them .... ,
In contrast, Cortes
concluded that the circumstances of a 911 call, where the
caller reports a crime, are within the definition of
"interrogation."2 37 Although there are conceivable technical
differences between 911 calls and interrogations, an
expanded analysis reveals that, pragmatically, they are
conducted under similar circumstances.2 38
Both Moscat and Corella discussed the nature of a 911
call made by a witness and emphasized that a 911 call
summons the police to the aid of citizens. 9 Moscat set the
tone for Corella by stating that "[a] testimonial statement is
produced when the government summons a citizen to be a
witness," however the court explained that a 911 call does the
reverse.240 Crawford does not limit "testimonial" statements
to those elicited by the government. 24' Therefore, the simple
fact that the caller summons the government does not make
the call non-testimonial.2 4 2
The questions a 911 operator asks a caller also affect
whether a 911 call can be classified as an "interrogation" and
therefore "testimonial." A 911 call is composed of a series of
questions asked by an operator and responses produced by a
witness.24 3 The court in Corella found that an operator asks
questions to determine an appropriate response to the
incident, rather than to conduct an interrogation.2 "
However, in Cortes, the 911 operator asked questions about
the shooter's description and direction of movement, neither
of which was relevant to helping the victim or stopping the
24
crime. 24
In fact, those questions were more relevant for
purposes of a police investigation.24 6 Although the primary
concern of a 911 operator may be to help the victim, it cannot
be denied that a secondary purpose may also be to gather
236. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4 (holding that statements given in response
to structured police questioning fall within the definition of "interrogation");
Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th at 468.
237. People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (App. Div. 2004).
238. See id.
239. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 879; Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th at 468.
240. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
241. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
242. See id.
243. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 1, at 1242-43.
244. Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th at 468.
245. People v. Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (App. Div. 2004).
246. Id.

2006]

911 "TESTIMONY"AFTER CRAWFORD

731

relevant information for a future police investigation.2 4 7
Unlike Moscat and Corella, in which the courts declined
to equate a 911 call with a police interrogation,248 Cortes
24 9
involved a witness to the crime as opposed to a victim.
However, this fact alone may not help courts decide whether
a 911 call is an "interrogation" because the reasoning outlined
in Cortes is not limited to witnesses.25 ° Cortes focused on the
public's knowledge of the information necessary to place a 911
call, including the crime reporting function and formal
procedures of 911 calls.25 1 Since all three cases present a
different analysis, courts have much to consider and a variety
of factors to weigh.
V. PROPOSAL
In the face of the uncertainty created by Crawford, courts
need a uniform test to determine the admissibility of 911
calls. Such a test should be based on the timing of the call
relative to the crime because this is a factor common to all
911 calls and provides a narrow test.
Courts should
uniformly use this distinction in analyzing whether a 911 call
is "testimonial."
The facts of a case are key in determining if a particular
911 call is "testimonial." Courts must be given flexibility in
determining on a case-by-case basis whether to admit 911
calls into court, but this must be accomplished with a uniform
test.
A. 911 Calls Made Close in Time to the Incident Are Not
"Testimonial"
A 911 call made reasonably close in time to the incident
should not be considered "testimonial."
The issue of
"reasonableness" is a fact-based question, resolved using the
court's discretion. A 911 call is a considerably accurate
reflection of the events that occurred, especially when the call
is made while the incident is in progress or shortly thereafter.
The primary purpose of a 911 call when made close in

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 1, at 1242.
See discussion supra Part II.D.l.a.
See supra Part II.D.2.a.
Cortes, 781 N.Y.S.2d at 404-06, 415-16.
Id. at 405-07.
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time to the incident is to seek assistance, not to provide
testimony for future prosecution.
Crawford held police
interrogations and testimony, either at a preliminary
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, to be
"testimonial"252 because all primarily occur with prosecution
as a goal. However, the goal of a 911 call is to seek
assistance.25 3 Therefore, when a 911 call is made close in
time to the incident, it is not "testimonial" in nature.
B. Balancing Test Where More Than Reasonable Time Has
Lapsed
When a court finds that more than a reasonable amount
of time has passed between the incident and a 911 call, it
should consider different factors. Most importantly, it should
consider the nature of the call and whether there was
actually an emergency.
Under this approach, the "nature" of a 911 call is
determined by asking whether the caller called 911 primarily
to seek assistance, or to provide information which could be
used for prosecution. As one commentator has noted, "The
more the statement narrates events, rather than merely
asking for help, the more likely it is to be considered
testimonial. ''254 Thus, as more time passes between the 911
call and the incident, the more likely it is that the call is
"testimonial."2 5
With time, the effects of the incident
stabilize and emergencies are unlikely. Courts should look at
the 911 call transcript to determine if the caller sought police
or medical attention.
Furthermore, courts could easily
determine if there was an actual emergency by looking at
police or medical reports and hearing testimony by personnel
who responded to the 911 call. Considering the 911 caller's
request and the response actually provided give clarity as to
whether a call was "testimonial."
C. Factorsthe Court Should Not Consider
Having discussed the factors that should be considered
by the court, it is important to exclude certain factors from

252.
253.
254.
255.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
See People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (Crim. Ct. 2004).
Friedman & McCormack, supra note 1, at 1242.
Id.
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consideration because they are misleading and add no value
to the analysis. For instance, courts have been incorrect to
use the 911 caller's state of mind to determine whether a 911
call is "testimonial. '256 Furthermore, the length and detail of
a 911 call should not be considered by the courts because it
has no determinative value.25 7 Lastly, the caller's status as
either a victim or witness should not be considered.
First, courts should not get entangled in the caller's state
of mind. Looking into the caller's state of mind, subjectively
or objectively, creates speculation and is highly unpredictable
due to the various factors a court could take into account.
The courts would be speculating what they think a reasonable
person in the caller's situation would have intended.2 58
Similarly, courts would also be speculating as to what the
caller was actually thinking. Crawford sought to eliminate
the uncertainty created by a judge's discretion over how
factors should be weighed. 2 9 Therefore, the caller's state of
mind should not be considered by the courts.
Second, the length and detail of the caller's statement is
not indicative of whether the call was being made to provide
information for prosecution. Typically, 911 operators ask a
series of questions, and the caller answers those questions.26 °
Thus, the length or detail of a caller's statements should be
attributed to the 911 operator's questions, which are not
within the caller's control. Both the 911 operator and the
caller have the same objective: to communicate sufficient
information to allow emergency services to provide
appropriate and effective assistance.2 61 For instance, when a
911 operator asks a victim his or her history with the
perpetrator, the operator is attempting to evaluate the
256. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
257. Some courts have found a statement to be more reliable because it is
detailed, while other courts have held a statement to be more reliable because
caller had limited information from a passing quickly through the incident.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004) (citing People v. Farrell, 34
P.3d 401, 407 (Colo. 2001); United States v. Photogrammetric Data Serv., Inc.,
259 F.3d 229, 245 (4th Cir. 2001)). Since a typical 911 call consists of a series of
questions by the operator, see Friedman & McCormack, supra note 1, at 1180,
the length of the call is in large part controlled by the number and type of
questions asked by the operator.
258. Hood & Padilla, supra note 10, at 85.
259. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
260. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 1, at 1180.
261. See People v. Corella, 122 Cal. App. 4th 461, 468 (Ct. App. 2004).
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situation and the perpetrator's actions to provide appropriate
aid.26 2 Thus, there is no constructive value in considering the
length and details of a 911 call when determining whether
the call is "testimonial."
Third, the caller's status is irrelevant because it is not
indicative of a call's "testimonial" nature. As discussed above,
a witness could call for assistance just as easily as a victim
could." 3 Similarly, a victim could call 911 to report a crime
rather than seek aid, as can a witness. 26 Thus, a caller's
status would serve no purpose in determining if a call is
"testimonial."
VI. CONCLUSION

After Crawford, "testimonial" statements made by an
unavailable witness are no longer admissible because of the
Confrontation Clause.26 5 Statements may be admitted in
court only if the defendant had a prior opportunity to crossexamine the unavailable declarant. 6 Crawford caused much
uncertainty in the lower courts with respect to 911 calls, and
this uncertainty must be resolved.26 7 It is important that
courts have a uniform test they can consistently follow so that
certainty can be created for prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and the court.
As a policy mater, this concern is particularly relevant
where prosecutors in domestic violence cases rely on 911 calls
to fill in the gaps when a victim is unavailable. 26 Domestic
violence victims must have courage to speak the truth during
the stress of the violent situation.2 69 Once a victim has the
opportunity to consider the possibility of future harm if he or
she testifies during prosecution, the victim may be less
candid.27 ° In this instance it is clear that a 911 call is often
significant evidence at trial. Therefore, courts must take a
262. See Friedman & McCormack, supra note 1, at 1243.
263. See supra Part IV.A.
264. See id.
265. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
266. Id. at 53-54.
267. See Hood & Padilla, supra note 10, at 85; see discussion supra Part II.D.
268. Tom Lininger, ProsecutingBatterersAfter Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747,
771 (2005).
269. Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of Victimless
Prosecution?,28 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 301, 327 (2005).
270. Id.
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uniform approach when determining the admissibility of a
911 call.
Since a 911 call can be crucial to a case, the risk of a
crucial 911 call not being admitted is far too great when
courts have no guidelines. This comment proposes a twoprong test that creates flexibility and sets an uniform
standard for all courts in deciding whether a 911 call should
be considered a "testimonial" statement.

